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Abstract
This paper studies how voters’ demand for economic reforms aﬀects the probability
of their adoption and their chances of success. We study a model of electoral com-
petition with rationally ignorant voters in which the success of a reform is tied to a
politician’s unobservable competence. We show that when voters’ demand for reform is
high, candidates engage in a form of populism and propose reformist agendas regardless
of their ability to successfully carry them out. As voters are then faced with either risky
populist reformers or policy inaction, the relationship between demand for reform and
the probability of their adoption depends on how harmful botched reforms are. Our
results help organize the mixed empirical evidence regarding the impact of crises on the
likelihood of reform. They also suggest that the rise of populism may cause political
disenchantment rather than the other way round.
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1 Introduction
Under what conditions are economic reforms successfully enacted? Confronted with a stark
divergence between widely accepted academic prescriptions and policy practice (e.g., Drazen,
2000, p.403), numerous studies have identiﬁed political constraints stiﬂing reform. These
include politicians’ electoral concerns, their human capital, distributional conﬂicts, and un-
certainty over the consequences of reform.1
While addressing important aspects of the problem, previous theoretical works generally
fall short on two points. First, the role of voters is not well understood: Voters are not
passive recipients of politicians’ decisions, and their support for reformist agendas is not
always guaranteed (Stokes, 1996). Second, the relationship between economic conditions and
the political constraints on reform remains somewhat elusive. For instance, the conventional
scholarly wisdom that economic crises trigger reform has received serious empirical challenges
(e.g., Drazen and Easterly, 2001; Pop-Eleches, 2009).
In this paper, we show that voters’ greater demand for reform does not necessarily cor-
relate with increased support for reformist candidates. High demand for reform generates
populism whereby candidates adopt reformist agendas regardless of their ability to success-
fully carry them out. As a result, the average competence of reformist candidates falls, and so
does voters’ opinion of politicians advocating policy change. Depending on the consequences
of an unsuccessful reform, the voter welfare-maximizing equilibrium exhibits either (i) a sta-
tus quo bias where the probability of reform adoption (henceforth, probability of reform) is
signiﬁcantly reduced, or (ii) a form of rational populism where reform is more likely to be
adopted but also more likely to be botched. These results imply that the chances of reform
implementation in times of high demand for change—such as economic crisis—depend crit-
ically on the type of reforms being envisioned by politicians or suggested by international
organizations.
While others have stressed the role of voters’ uncertainty in the adoption of reforms
(Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991; Drazen, 2000, Chapter 13.), our theory is unique in highlighting
how voters’ demand for reforms aﬀect the strategic interaction between politicians and voters.
Voters’ opinion of reformist agendas and candidates’ willingness to propose them cannot be
1We review the literature in Section 1.1. For an excellent review of the early literature on this issue, see
Drazen (2000, Chapter 10 and 13).
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understood separately, and are related in a subtle way.
Our model features two candidates competing for oﬃce and a representative voter (to
whom we reserve the pronoun ‘she’). Candidates privately observe their competence level
and choose a platform: They can either commit to a status quo policy or to a reform policy
(which is costlier to implement). In our setting, competence has three key characteristics.
First, competence decreases a politician’s cost of implementing the reform policy. Second,
it aﬀects the quality of its implementation: The voter prefers reform to the status quo if
and only if it is implemented by a competent politician as incompetent politicians produce
botched reforms. Third, candidates cannot directly reveal their competence to the voter.
Unlike competence, policy platforms can be credibly communicated during an electoral
campaign, but this process is not friction-less. Speciﬁcally, (as in Prato and Wolton, 2016)
successful learning of candidates’ platform requires that the voter pays costly attention to the
campaign and the candidate exerts communication eﬀort to reach the voter (e.g., campaign
spending).
The voter’s rational ignorance plays a key role in our theory. As the reform policy is costly
to implement, candidates need to be electorally rewarded for their reformist commitment,
which can occur only if the voter pays suﬃcient attention to the campaign. For the voter,
the value of learning a candidate’s platform depends on her expected payoﬀ from selecting
a reformist candidate. This payoﬀ, in turn, is a function of three elements: (i) the voter’s
demand for reform—the payoﬀ gain from a successful reform over the status quo—, (ii) their
selection concern—the payoﬀ loss from a botched reform relative to the status quo—, and
(iii) competent and incompetent candidates’ strategic platform choices.
A novel implication of our approach is that voters’ incentive to pay attention to the
campaign depends on politicians’ equilibrium behavior, which in turn responds to voters’
attention. Absent variation in attention, the probability of reform and its chances of success
would not be aﬀected by voter’s demand for reform and selection concern.2
When the screening problem faced by the voter is non-trivial (i.e., politicians’ costs of
implementing the reform policy vary little with competence), the voter welfare is maximized
when candidates play a separating strategy and commit to the reform policy only if compe-
2To address the multiplicity of equilibria that is often encountered in games of imperfect information, we
focus on the best-case scenario for the voter, and select the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium that maximizes the
voter ex-ante welfare.
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tent. Under this candidates’ strategy proﬁle, the probability of reform is positive and the
probability of botched reform is null. We show that even though commitment to reform
entails a cost (it is not cheap talk) and this cost is lower for competent candidates (the
single-crossing condition holds), this separating strategy cannot be part of an equilibrium
when the demand for reform is high.
To understand this result, suppose that in time of high demand, only competent candi-
dates were to propose the reform policy. In that case, the voter would pay great attention
to the campaign, since platforms are a perfect signal of competence and the payoﬀ gain
from electing a competent candidate is large. But very high attention by the voter magniﬁes
the electoral reward associated with a reformist agenda, and all candidates—competent and
incompetent—prefer to propose the reform policy. As a result, a separating strategy is not
individually rational for candidates whenever the demand for reform is relatively high.
The reasoning above implies that when reforms are most needed, electoral competition
become comparatively less eﬀective at protecting the voter from harmful policy changes. In
any pure strategy equilibrium with a positive probability of reform, incompetent candidates
engage in a form of populism by campaigning on reform policies that they know will be
harmful. As platforms are no longer fully informative about candidates’ competence, the
voter becomes skeptical of reformist agenda and reduces her attention to the campaign. In
our model, democratic disenchantment is triggered by the rise of populist candidates, not the
other way round. In equilibrium, higher demand for reform can be associated with a lower
likelihood of policy change. We show that this correlation depends critically on the voter’s
selection concern.
When the selection concern is large, the equilibrium which maximizes voter welfare ex-
hibits a stiﬂing of reform: either all candidates commit to the status quo, or reformist
candidates are unlikely to win as a result of voter’s skepticism. When the voter’s selection
concern is relatively small, the welfare-maximizing equilibrium features a form of rational
populism in which most candidates (in some cases, all of them) adopt a reformist stance. As
a result, the reform policy is likely to be adopted but faces a signiﬁcant probability of failure.
Our results imply that the the adoption of reform and its likelihood of success depend
on the underlying economic conditions and on the type of policy domain in a subtle way. In
particular, the correlation between crises—arguably a time of high demand for reform—and
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policy changes is not unambiguously positive. When the social costs of botched reforms are
high (e.g., reforms require certain political skills), crises should stiﬂe reform. Only when
these costs are moderate crises should trigger reform.
While our results go against the conventional wisdom that reforms are more likely in time
of crises (Tommasi and Velasco, 1996), they help explain the mixed empirical evidence on
the issue. A few papers conﬁrm the conventional wisdom (e.g., Alesina et al., 2006; Prati
et al., 2013), whereas several others ﬁnd that crises reduce the probability of reforms (e.g.,
Campos et al., 2010; Mian et al., 2014). As our theory shows, the eﬀect of crises on reforms
cannot be properly understood without controlling for the importance of competence (as
approximated by the selection concern). Indeed, as Drazen and Easterly (2001) document,
crises decrease the likelihood of reforms whenever political competence is crucial for success
and crises trigger reform only on policy dimensions in which the voter’s selection concern is
arguably low.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper belongs to a literature studying political constraints to reform and, more broadly,
to accountability. Previous theories have stressed the role of policy-makers’ reputational
concerns (e.g., Fu and Li, 2014), the diﬃculty of recruiting competent policy-makers into
public service (e.g., Mattozzi and Merlo, 2007), the inﬂuence of special interest groups on
candidate’s behavior (e.g., Baron, 1994; Grossman and Helpman, 1996; Prat, 2002; Coate,
2004; Ashworth, 2006), conﬂicts over the allocation of the costs of reforms (e.g., Alesina and
Drazen, 1991), and uncertainty over the distributions of their beneﬁts and costs (Fernandez
and Rodrik 1991).
Our paper shows that the electorate’s demand for reform can also be an impediment to its
adoption and success due to candidates engaging in populism, deﬁned as incompetent candi-
dates proposing harmful reforms. As such, our notion of rational populism is complementary
to Acemoglu et al. (2013) (where it is driven by concerns to signal one’s ideological congru-
ence, rather than expertise) and to more traditional notions of anti-elitism, anti-globalism
and anti-pluralism (see, e.g., Judis, 2016, Mueller, 2016, and Guiso et al., 2017). Our ﬁnd-
ings also provide an interesting counterpart to Majumdar and Mukand (2004) who show that
unsuccessful policy changes may trigger more reforms and successful changes less reforms,
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due to politicians’ reputation concerns.
Joining a growing literature, our paper focuses on the role of electoral communication in
shaping candidates’ behavior. Most previous works view campaigns as a unidirectional pro-
cess: candidates informing voters (e.g., Prat, 2002; Coate, 2004; Ashworth, 2006; Dewan and
Hortala-Vallve, 2017) or strategically choosing messages to inﬂuence their electoral decision
(Aragone`s et al., 2014; Westermark, 2004), or voters choosing whether to acquire information
about candidates (e.g., Martinelli, 2006; Svolik, 2013; Hortala-Vallve and Larcinese, 2016).
Our approach to rationally ignorant voters, instead, builds upon Dewatripont and Tirole
(2005), and allows for voters (receivers) information to depend on their level of attention and
candidates’ (senders’) eﬀort.
A few studies analyze rationally ignorant voters in settings with ﬁxed alternatives, in
which the key issue is information aggregation (e.g., Martinelli, 2006; Oliveros, 2013; Levy
and Razin, 2015).3 To our knowledge, only a handful of papers embed rationally ignorant
voters in a political agency setting. Hortala-Vallve and Larcinese (2016) and Svolik (2013)
examine, in diﬀerent contexts, how institutional factors interact with voter’s ability to ob-
serve politicians’ actions and learn from them. Glaeser et al. (2005), Ashworth and Bueno de
Mesquita (2014), Ogden (2017), and Nunnari and Zapal (2017) study how various behavioral
biases inﬂuence candidates’ platform choices. Matejka and Tabellini (2016) embed rational
inattention in a probabilistic voting model to study the relationship between ideology and in-
formation, as well as the resulting electoral incentives for public good and targeted spending.
The present manuscript complements this literature by analyzing how economic conditions
aﬀect policy outcomes via politicians’ electoral incentives.
On a technical level, this paper is closely related to Prato andWolton (2016).4 Speciﬁcally,
the model of electoral communication and the analysis leading up to the non-existence of a
separating equilibrium (Proposition 1) is very similar to the results presented in Prato and
Wolton (2016). The two papers, however, diﬀer in two critical dimensions. First, while
Prato and Wolton (2016) focus on voter behavior and examine the relationship between
interest and attention in politics, the present work analyzes policy-makers’ incentives and
3The notion of agents’ “rational inattention” (Sims, 1998; 2010) has also been used in the macroeconomic
literature to study issues such as nominal rigidities (Mac`kowiak and Wiederholt, 2009), the home bias (Van
Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2009), or informational ﬂows in organizations (Calvo´-Armengol et al., 2015).
4Prato and Wolton (2017) study how rational ignorance tends to exacerbate or mitigate electoral imbal-
ances (deﬁned as asymmetries in voters’ opinions of party labels or candidates) in a model without moral
hazard (which play a key role in the present analysis).
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their impact on the type and quality of policy-making. Second, it provides a complete
equilibrium characterization. This, in turns, allows us to identify the impact of the voter’s
selection concern on the probability of reform, which cannot be foreseen from Prato and
Wolton (2016).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next Section, we describe the
model. In Section 3, we study conditions under which the democratic system performs best.
In Section 4, we characterize equilibrium outcomes when demand for reform is high. Section
5 applies our ﬁndings to the empirical literature on crises and reform. Section 6 discusses
the robustness of our results and Section 7 concludes. Proofs are collected in the Appendix.
In the Supplemental Appendix, we provide a few ancillary results.
2 Model
We study a one-period game with a representative voter and two candidates (1 and 2). Before
the campaign candidate j ∈ {1, 2} privately observes his type tj ∈ {c, n}, where c denotes
competent and n incompetent. It is common knowledge that the probability candidate j is
competent is Pr(tj = c) = q. Candidate j can credibly commit to a policy platform, either
a status quo policy (rj = 0) or a reform policy (rj = 1), which is costly to implement. The
eﬀect of competence is two-fold. First, the cost of carrying out the reform policy is lower for
a competent politician than an incompetent one. Second, the voter beneﬁts from the reform
policy (compared to the status quo) only if it is enacted by a competent politician.
While a candidate’s competence is unobservable to the voter, she can learn a candidate’s
platform during the campaign. The probability the voter learns a candidate’s platform,
however, depends on her level of attention to the campaign (x ∈ [0, 1]) and on the candidate’s
communication eﬀort to reach her (yj ∈ [0, 1], j ∈ {1, 2}, which cannot be directly observed).
For tractability reason, we assume that the probability that communication is successful—
the voter observes candidate j’s platform—is yjx. After the campaign, the voter elects one
of the two candidates, whom we denote by e ∈ {1, 2}.
The voter’s utility function depends on the policy implemented by the elected politician
and her level of attention. When the status quo policy is implemented, the voter’s payoﬀ
is independent of the politician’s competence, and is normalized to zero. When the reform
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policy is implemented, the voter enjoys a payoﬀ gain of G > 0 (relative to the status quo) if
the politician is competent, and suﬀers a loss τG, with τ ≥ 0, if the politician is incompetent.
Due to cognitive constraints (or the opportunity cost of listening to political messages), paying
attention to politics is costly for the voter, as captured by the function Cv(·). The voter’s
preferences are represented by the following utility function:
uv(re, x) =
⎧⎨⎩ reG− Cv(x) if e is competent−reτG− Cv(x) otherwise (1)
Candidates are oﬃce-motivated. We normalize their payoﬀ from being out of oﬃce to 0.
A politician’s payoﬀ in oﬃce is equal to 1 when he chooses the status quo policy, and 1− kt
when he implements the reform policy. The implementation cost kt, t ∈ {c, n} captures the
time, resources and political capital required to carry out a reformist agenda, and satisﬁes:
0 < kc < kn < 1. Candidates also face a cost C(·) to reach the voter, which corresponds
to the diﬃculty of deﬁning and disseminating a clear message in a noisy environment. The
utility function of candidate j ∈ {1, 2} is then:
uj(rj, yj; t) =
⎧⎨⎩ 1− ktrj − C(yj) if elected−C(yj) otherwise (2)
To summarize, the timing of the game is:
1. Nature draws the type tj ∈ {c, n} of candidate j ∈ {1, 2}.
2. Candidate j ∈ {1, 2} privately observes his type and credibly commits to either the
status quo policy (rj = 0) or the reform policy (rj = 1).
3. During the campaign, candidate j ∈ {1, 2} exerts communication eﬀort yj. Simultane-
ously, the voter chooses her level of attention x. With probability yjx, communication
is successful and the voter learns candidate j’s platform (rj). Otherwise, the voter does
not observe rj.
4. The voter elects one of the two candidates: e ∈ {1, 2}.
5. The elected candidate e implements re, the game ends, and payoﬀs are realized.
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The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in pure strategies (with
the caveat that the voter tosses a fair coin when indiﬀerent), and excluding weakly-dominated
strategies (we discuss mixed strategy equilibria in the robustness section). A formal deﬁnition
of PBE in our setting can be found in Appendix A (see Deﬁnition 1). When more than one
such PBE exist, we select the PBE that maximizes the voter ex-ante welfare (a common
criterion in the literature). Hereafter, the term PBE refers to strategy proﬁles satisfying
Deﬁnition 1 and the term ‘equilibrium’ refers to the voter welfare-maximizing PBE.
2.1 Assumptions
We impose some restrictions on the voter’s and candidates’ payoﬀs.
Assumption 1. The functions Cv(·) and C(·) satisfy the following properties:
i Both are twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly convex on (0, 1];
ii lim
x→0
C ′v(x) = lim
x→0
C ′(y) = 0, lim
x→1
C ′v(x) = lim
x→1
C ′(y) = ∞
iii C ′′v (0) = 0
iv C ′′(·) and C ′′v (·) are weakly increasing
Assumption 1.i and 1.ii follow directly from Dewatripont and Tirole (2005). Assumption
1.iii is novel and suﬃcient for positive attention to be individually rational for voters at the
campaigning stage—provided that platforms are informative signals of policy outcomes. We
impose Assumption 1.iv in order to guarantee the uniqueness of candidates’ communication
eﬀorts and voter’s attention level in a separating PBE. It is meant to simplify the exposition
and relaxing this assumption would not aﬀect our results.5
As argued by Rodrik (1996), voters are unwilling to simply act as rubber stamp of an
ambitious reformist agenda. We thus assume the voter is initially conservative (in a Burkean
sense):
Assumption 2. The selection concern τ satisﬁes: q − (1− q)τ < 0.
5Speciﬁcally, our results would apply to the highest and lowest equilibrium communication levels. As
an example, the function (1 − x)−1 − 1 − x − x2 satisﬁes the assumptions. More generally, one can replace
Assumption 1.iii with a weaker condition (C ′′v (0)C
′′(0) < c, with c < q(1 − q)(1 − kc)G2 ) without aﬀecting
any of the paper’s results.
9
Assumption 3 implies that absent updates from the electoral campaign, the voter prefers the
status quo policy to the reform policy, due to her prior about candidate j’s competence and
the payoﬀ loss caused by a botched reform (i.e., a reform implemented by an incompetent
politician).
Finally, we assume that the voter’s screening problem is nontrivial.
Assumption 3. There exists k∗(kc) ∈ (kc, 1], such that kn < k∗(kc)
This assumption guarantees that, whenever individually rational, in equilibrium candi-
dates play a separating strategy: Commit to the reform only if competent, as formally shown
in Lemma A.6 in the Appendix.6 Unlike Prato and Wolton (2016), we maintain the assump-
tion on the implementation costs throughout the paper as it allows us to characterize the set
of PBE and the equilibrium of the game for all parameter values.
2.2 Discussion
The main novelty of our framework is that the probability of learning a candidate’s platform
depends critically on the voter’s costly attention to the campaign. As such, in our set-
up, the voter is “rationally ignorant” (Downs, 1957). Our approach is also consistent with
experimental and empirical works documenting that voters are cognitively constrained (Body,
2014; Brocas et al., 2014) and learn incrementally (Neuman et al., 1992; Zaller, 1992).
Furthermore, our campaigning technology assumes complementarity between the voter’s level
of attention and candidates’ communication eﬀorts: greater voter attention increases the
eﬀectiveness of a candidate’s communication eﬀort, and vice versa. This complementarity
assumption, however, is not essential for our results but facilitates the analysis.7
The voter’s key electoral concern regards the successful implementation of a major shift in
economic policy. Speciﬁcally, our model is geared towards policy areas (i) with a substantial
“common value” component and (ii) for which political (as opposed to technical) skills are
required for successful implementation.
6When kn − kc is large, there can exist an asymmetric PBE in which a candidate proposes the reform
policy independently of his type and his opponent plays a separating strategy. Such asymmetric PBE can
dominate a separating PBE when the diﬀerence between implementation costs is large. The existence of such
PBE is subject to the same incentive compatibility constraints that are necessary for a separating PBE to
exist. As such, our key insights extend to this asymmetric PBE, albeit at the cost of a signiﬁcantly more
convoluted analysis.
7As long as voter attention is a costly choice variable, candidates’ platform choices should respond to it,
and our results would go through.
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We model two dimensions of a policy domain: the demand for reform G and the selection
concern τ . Parameter G captures the economic conditions and the value of a successful
reform relative to the status quo. Parameter τ captures the importance of a politician’s
skills for success and the baseline appeal of the status quo policy relative to the downside
risk of botched reform. A large G is associated with worse economic conditions, in which a
successful reform is more valuable. A large τ corresponds to (i) more complex policy domains,
where lack of competence in carrying out reforms has important welfare consequences, and
(ii) high-risk situations in which the damage of botched reform is substantial.
3 Conditions for successful reforms
Due to the social cost of botched reforms, guaranteeing that only competent politicians
implement reforms appears like a ﬁrst-order concern.
Under the assumptions, the constrained ﬁrst-best for the voter’s perspective is that both
candidates play a separating strategy proﬁle in which they commit to the reform policy only
when competent. In this case, platforms are perfect signals of competence, and increased
attention directly augments the probability of electing a competent reformist candidate. To
determine the conditions for existence of a separating PBE, we ﬁrst establish some general
properties of the voter’s and candidates’ behavior. In the remainder of this section the
analysis proceeds informally; formal statements of all intermediary lemmas are relegated to
the Appendix.
First, since an incompetent candidate’s beneﬁt from holding oﬃce is weakly lower than
a competent politician’s (due to the diﬀerence in implementation costs), the former always
exerts weakly less communication eﬀort.
Second, the status quo policy is the default option for all candidates, since it entails no
implementation cost. Neither type thus has an incentive to actively advertise a commitment
to the default option. Commitments to the reform policy, on the other hand, have to be
advertised. As a consequence, successful communication must always raise a candidate’s
winning probability, otherwise commitment to reform would never be individually rational
(see Lemma A.2). Hence, a candidate exert positive communication eﬀort if and only if he
commits to the reform policy (see Lemma A.3).
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Third, there always exists an “unresponsive” PBE in which both candidates choose the
status quo regardless of their types, voters pay no attention to the campaign, ﬂips a coin
to choose her representative, and the status quo policy is implemented with probability one
(see Lemma A.4).
In light of these results, two conditions need to be met for a separating PBE to exist.
First, it must be that the electoral reward for committing to the reform policy is large enough
to compensate a competent candidate for the cost of advertising and carrying out a reformist
commitment. This is a competent candidate’s incentive compatibility constraint. Second,
the electoral reward must also be small enough so that a non-competent candidate actually
prefers to commit to the status quo rather than the reform policy. This is an incompetent
candidate’s incentive compatibility constraint.
A candidate’s electoral reward for reform, in turn, depends critically on the voter’s at-
tention. When only competent candidates propose the reform, the value of learning a can-
didate’s platform depends on the payoﬀ gain G from electing a reformist candidate (who
enacts a successful reform) compared to an incompetent politician who sticks to the status
quo. The voter’s level of attention in a separating assessment is thus an increasing function
of her demand for reform. Since greater attention increases the eﬀectiveness of a candidate’s
communication (due to the complementarity in the learning technology), a competent can-
didate’s communication eﬀort is also increasing in G. This result, formally shown in Lemma
A.9, implies that the electoral reward for reform is strictly increasing in G.
Due to the relationship between a candidate’s electoral reward for reformist commitment
and the demand for reform, the existence of a separating PBE depends critically on the
value of G. For low demand for reform, the voter pays little attention to the electoral
campaign even if only competent candidates propose the reform policy. Consequently, the
electoral reward for reformist commitment is low and, owing to the the implementation cost
kc > 0, no competent candidate has suﬃcient incentive to propose the reform policy. For
high demand for reform, a competent candidate has suﬃcient electoral incentives to commit
to the reform unless the implementation cost is very large. As such for suﬃciently low kc,
there exists a lower bound on the demand for reform, denoted G > 0, such that a competent
candidate’s incentive compatibility constraint in a separating assessment is satisﬁed if and
only if G ≥ G.
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High electoral reward associated with reformist commitment also means that a candidate’s
chance of winning the election when it proposes the status quo is low. Consequently, relatively
high demand for reform increases an incompetent candidate’s incentive to deviate and propose
the reform policy. This implies that, unless the implementation cost kn is very large, there
exists G > G such that an incompetent candidate’s incentive compatibility constraint in a
separating assessment is satisﬁed if and only if G ≤ G. The next proposition summarizes the
analysis above.
Proposition 1. There exist unique kc and kn (independent of G) such that:
(i) When kc ≥ kc, a separating strategy proﬁle is not a PBE for any parameter value;
(ii) When kc < kc and kn ≥ kn, there exists a unique G > 0 such that the equilibrium is
separating if and only if G ≥ G;
(iii) When kc < kc and kn < kn, there also exists a unique G > G such that the equilibrium
is separating if and only if G ∈ [G,G].
Proposition 1 highlights that an increase in the demand for reform can induce a change in
candidates’ platform choices. This change, however, depends critically on the voter’s rational
ignorance. If attention was ﬁxed, G would have no eﬀect on candidates’ behavior (speciﬁcally,
on their incentive compatibility constraints).
Since a separating assessment maximizes the voter welfare, there exists of a non-monotonic
relationship between the voter’s demand for reform and her welfare (see Figure 1b). Indeed,
when kc < kc and kn < kn, the voter’s equilibrium expected payoﬀ has a discontinuous drop
at G.
This section implies that unless reforms entail large implementation costs, the equilibrium
is separating only when the demand for reform is intermediary. In all that follows, we assume
that kc < kc kn < kn, and study how the probability of policy and the likelihood of botched
reform change when G crosses the threshold G.
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4 Reform in Times of High Demand
The Stiﬂing of Reform
When G > G, the equilibrium can be either unresponsive (candidates always propose the
status quo policy) or one of several over-responsive PBE, in which at least one candidate
commits to the reform policy when incompetent.
Regardless of which equilibrium arises, Proposition 2 shows that when the payoﬀ from
reform is highly responsive to a politicians’ competence, in times of high demand the elec-
torate faces a signiﬁcant drop in the probability of reform (to 0, if the equilibrium becomes
unresponsive.)
Proposition 2. There exists τ 0 and τ ≤ τ 0 such that:
(i) for all τ > τ 0, the equilibrium is unresponsive for all G > G and the probability of reform
drops to zero as G crosses G.
(ii) for all τ > τ , the probability of reform decreases as G crosses G.
Proposition 2 distinguishes between two possibilities as a function of the size of the
selection concern. When τ is very large (case (i)), the cost of botched reforms is so high
that the voter prefers an unresponsive PBE to any possible PBE with positive probability of
reform.
Conversely, when the selection concern τ is intermediate (so botched reform is still sig-
niﬁcantly worse than the status quo), the equilibrium is over-responsive and asymmetric:
one candidate—say, candidate 1—chooses reform regardless of his type, and the other—say,
candidate 2—chooses the status quo regardless of his type. Notice that in an over-responsive
equilibrium the campaign plays a radically diﬀerent role compared to a separating assess-
ment. Voters infer valuable information not from a candidate’s platform (since both types
propose the reformist platform), but from the event that communication is successful. While
successful communication is a positive signal of competence and leads to 1’s election, it is
also imperfect. Consequently, the value of learning 1’s platform is strictly decreasing in the
downside risk that he is incompetent (τ). This form of rational skepticism about the useful-
ness of electoral communication results in low voter attention and low probability of electing
a reformist candidate when τ is large enough. Hence, despite the commonly known presence
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of a reformist candidate, the probability of reform still decreases as the demand of reform
increases above G.
Rational Populism
When the voter’s selection concern is relatively small, the equilibrium is always over-responsive.
Our model thus uncovers a form of rational populism. In the best feasible PBE from the
voter’s perspective, at least one incompetent candidate commits to the reform policy despite
common knowledge that his reform will be botched. As a result, for relatively low τ , the
equilibrium probability of botched reform always increases when G goes over the threshold G.
Further, if the cost of botched reform is suﬃciently low, the probability of reform increases
because either both candidates always propose the reform or, despite her rational skepti-
cism, the voter pays suﬃciently attention to the reformist candidate when the equilibrium is
asymmetric.
Proposition 3. There exists τR and τ , with τR ≤ τ ≤ τ such that, in equilibrium:
(i) for all τ < τ the probability of botched reform is strictly higher for G > G than for
G ∈ [G,G].
(ii) for all τ < τR the probability of botched reform and the probability of reform are strictly
higher for G > G than for G ∈ [G,G].
Observe that, by the reasoning above, rational populism can also stiﬂe reform. In an
asymmetric equilibrium, we can observe both an increase in botched reform when G goes
over G (Proposition 3.(i)) and a decrease in the probability a reform is enacted (Proposition
2.(ii)). This case is illustrated in Figure 1a. Figure 1b in turn shows the welfare consequences
of high demand for reforms. Voter welfare exhibits a discontinuous drop as G goes over G
as in equilibrium, the risk of botched reforms becomes non-null and the voter is rationally
skeptical about the value of campaign information.
The discontinuous drop in welfare at G we document can be related to the ﬁndings in
Carrillo and Castanheira (2008), who show that candidates’ invest in high-quality policies and
voter welfare is higher when the likelihood that the electorate learns candidates’ platforms
is intermediary. Crucially, in this paper voters’ learning is endogenous to their demand from
reform and candidates’ behavior, whereas it is exogenous in Carrillo and Castanheira’s model.
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(a) Probability of reform (b) Voter’s expected welfare
Figure 1: Equilibrium probability of reform and voter’s welfare
In Figure 1b, the dark line is the voter’s equilibrium welfare. In Figure 1a, the dark line is the probability
the reform policy is implemented; the red dashed line is the probability of botched reform. Parameter
values: q = 1/2, kc = 1/4, kn = 1/2, τ = 1.01, Cv(x) = (1/5)(1/(1 − x) + x + 2 log(1 − x) − 1), C(y) =
(1/10)(1/(1− x) + x+ 2 log(1− y)− 1).
5 Populism, Crises, and Reforms
Our model generates two novel ﬁndings. First, periods of high demand for reform can generate
rational populism. Second, due to the unavoidable risk of botched reform and the induced
skepticism on the part of voters, the likelihood that any policy change is implemented when
demand for reform is high can be lower than when demand for reform is intermediary. We
turn to the implications of these two results in what follows.
Recent years have seen a rise in populism both in Europe (e.g., UKIP in the UK, Front
National in France, AfD in Germany) and in the United States (e.g., Tea Party, Bernie
Sanders, Donald J Trump). As in Guiso et al. (2017), populist candidates emerge because
there exists an electoral demand for it. In this paper, however, populism is not driven
by discontent with existing mainstream parties. Voters would rather avoid any populism,
but cannot design appropriate incentives for competent and incompetent candidates due to
their incomplete information and the blunt tool at their disposal. Populism, in some sense,
is a necessary evil.8 Nonetheless, it is detrimental through two channels: (i) it leads to
botched reforms and (ii) it triggers voter’s rational skepticism. If one equates skepticism
with dissatisfaction with politics (as it reduces voter attention), our results suggest that,
8Despite similarities, the rational populism we document is also distinct from Acemoglu et al.’s (2013). In
particular, under our approach populism is due to bad (incompetent) type seeking to mimic good (competent)
types rather than good type trying to signal their congruence with the electorate.
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contrary to Guiso et al.’s hypotheses, populism generates disenchantment rather than the
other way round. Both, however, are caused themselves by the “excessively” high demand
for reform.
Our theory, more generally, can be used to link economic conditions—and speciﬁcally
the presence of a crisis—to the occurrence of reform and its likelihood of success, and help
organize the existing empirical ﬁndings on the issue.
In our model, a reform can be a change of economic paradigm (including privatization
and deregulation packages) as in 1980s Latin America, a major overhaul on a speciﬁc issue
such as health care (e.g., the Aﬀordable Care Act in 2010), labor laws (e.g., the reforms in
New Zealand in the 1990s) or welfare beneﬁts (such as Portugal’s 2011 spending cuts). These
policy domains can diﬀer in two dimensions: the upside gain from successful implementation
(G) and the downside risk—relative to inaction—from a botched reform (τ), which depends
on the importance of a politician’s skills and the depth of the crisis (i.e., the electorate’s
evaluation of the status quo relative to any type of reforms).9
Consistently with its empirical operationalization, we follow Drazen and Grilli (1993),
Laba´n and Sturzenegger (1994a and 1994b), Mondino et al. (1996), and Drazen and Ilzetzki
(2011) in linking a crisis to a period of large demand for reform G > G (in turn, G ≤ G
corresponds to more favorable economic time when reforms are less needed). Our model
identiﬁes three possible outcomes:
• Reformist Populism: When the crisis is very deep or the importance of a politician’s
competence is moderate relative to more technical skills (τ ≤ τR), reform is guaranteed
as all candidates propose change, but the risk of botched reform is signiﬁcant.
• Stiﬂing of Reform: When the crisis is not too deep or the importance of a politician’s
competence is crucial (τ ≥ τ), no reform is implemented as all candidates propose the
status quo.
9The political skills required for successful implementation of such reforms include: the ability to set the
pace and scope of the reform or to engineer suitable compensation schemes for “losers” (Haggard and Webb,
1993), the shrewdness to successfully overcome veto players, the acumen to assemble eﬀective coalitions or
negotiate with international organizations and trade partners, the discernment required to staﬀ, insulate, and
control bureaucracies (for a discussion of the costs associated with any policy change, see Hall and Deardoﬀ,
2006). As the Latin America experience demonstrates (Dornbusch, 1988; Krueger, 1993), unsuccessful and
badly engineered reforms can impose signiﬁcant costs on a society and politicians’ competence play a key role
for the successful implementation of major policy changes (e.g., Krueger, 1992; Na´ım, 1993; Bresser Pereira,
1994).
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• Polarized Populism: When the depth of the crisis or the importance of politicians’
competence are intermediate (τ ∈ [τR, τ ]), a “party of order or stability” competes
against “a party of progress or reform” (Stuart Mill, 1859, Ch. II). Depending on G
and τ , the probability of reform may be lower or higher than before the crisis; the
likelihood of botched reforms is unambiguously greater.
Conventional wisdom holds that reforms are more likely in time of crises (Tommasi and
Velasco, 1996). Empirical evidence on the association between crises and reform is mixed:
Several studies document a negative eﬀect (Williamson, 1994; Pop-Eleches, 2009; Campos et
al., 2010; Castanheira et al., 2012; Pepinsky, 2012; Galasso, 2014; Mian et al., 2014), some
corroborate the conventional wisdom (Lora and Olivera, 2004; Alesina et al., 2006; Prati et
al., 2013), and others ﬁnd negative or positive associations depending on the policy areas
being analyzed (for a recent review of the literature, see Mahmalat and Curran, 2017). In
particular, Drazen and Easterly (2001) ﬁnd that crises are associated with a lower likelihood
of reform in policy domains in which political skills are crucial in ensuring success—such as
budget deﬁcit and current account balance—, while crises tend to be associated with reform
in policy domains in which technical knowledge is more important in ensuring success, such
as inﬂation and black market premium.10
This paper provides a way to organize these seemingly inconclusive empirical ﬁndings.
While none of the papers above test the speciﬁc mechanism identiﬁed in this paper (the
increased incentive of incompetent candidate to propose a reformist agendas), our model
suggests that the association between crises, the probability of reform, and the emergence
of populist responses depend critically on the downside risk of a botched reform τ . In times
in which voters are desperate for change (e.g., Latin America in 1980s and 1990s), a form
of reformist populism is likely to emerge. When the status quo is not as dire (e.g., US and
Europe in the aftermath of the Great Recession), polarized populism arises with a risky
reformist option (e.g., Donald Trump or Emmanuel Macron) facing a strongly pro-status quo
option (e.g., Hillary Clinton, Angela Merkel, or Mariano Rajoy). While the latter is ex-ante
more likely to win the election, the former can nevertheless prevail.
Finally, our theory also predicts that reforms in time of crisis are always more likely to
10Drazen and Easterly (2001) measure reforms by the growth performance 5 years after the crisis. As such,
their dependent variable does not distinguish clearly between low probability of reform and high probability
of botched reform. Notice, however, that both are compatible with our theory.
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be unsuccessful compared to more normal conditions despite the higher beneﬁts of successful
policy changes. While we are not aware of any existing empirical assessments of this claim, it
accords with several anecdotal pieces of evidence. For example, in Latin America in the 1980s,
periods of high inﬂation and negative growth led to attempts to reform an ineﬃcient economic
system (based on import-substitution industrialization) with stabilization and liberalization
packages. But some of these packages turned out to be poorly designed, aggravating rather
than solving the economic crisis (Krueger, 1992 and 1993; Mondino et al., 1996; Sturznegger
and Tommasi, 1998). Some reformist attempts were also misguided, such as Alan Garcia’s
populist economic policies in Peru in 1985-1988 (e.g., his ﬁnancial and banking reforms)
which led to hyperinﬂation (Dornbusch, 1988). Other examples include Domingo Cavallo’s
corralito to ﬁght inﬂation in 2001, or the more recent heterodox policies (as described in
Cavallo, 2014) aimed at improving economic conditions in Argentina, which in both cases
seem to have instead worsened the inﬂationary crisis.
6 Robustness
Mixed strategies In the baseline model, we focus on pure strategy PBE. Removing this
restriction does not substantially alter the message of the paper (see Appendix C for more
details). A mixed-strategy PBE can either be under-responsive (a c-type candidate mixes
and a n-type candidate chooses the status quo) or over-responsive (a c-type candidate always
proposes a reform and a n-type candidate mixes).11 When G is large enough the probability
of reform in an under-responsive PBE decreases in G, whereas when G is close enough to
G, the probability of botched reform and the (total) probability of reform increase in G in
an over-responsive PBE. Interestingly, in any under-responsive PBE in mixed strategies, the
probability of reform still drops discontinuously at G = G and so does voter welfare. In turn,
while the over-responsive mixed strategy PBE shares similar features with the asymmetric
PBE, it also diﬀers in one critical dimension: Platforms remain a noisy signal of competence
which attenuates voter’s rational skepticism.12
Fully symmetric cost of reform Our results require that competent and incompetent
11We show that there is no other mixed-strategy PBE. In Appendix C, it should be noted, we assume
existence and only characterize the properties of possible PBE.
12We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
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politicians diﬀer in some dimension for campaign to be informative. In the baseline model,
competence reduces the cost of implementing reforms (kn > kc). It is not necessarily the
case. All our insights, however, would survive if incompetent candidates faced a higher cost
of reaching voters (e.g., C ′(y;n) = (1 + ψ)C ′(y; c), with ψ > 0) or successful communication
of platforms also revealed a candidate’s type with some probability ζ > 0.13
Multiple levels of reform We conjecture that several of our main insights hold in a setting
with continuous level of reform. Suppose that candidates choose a level of reform in the unit
interval (r ∈ [0, 1]) at policy cost κI{r =0}+ ktr. Further assume that the beneﬁt of successful
reform for the voter is GQ(r), with Q(·) strictly quasi-concave with peak at r∗ ∈ (0, 1)
(the cost of botched reform is τQ(r)G). We expect a separating PBE in which competent
candidates propose r = r∗ and incompetent no reform to exist for intermediate G. Above a
certain threshold value for the demand for reform, the equilibrium is likely to feature some
rational populism either because type c candidates propose over-reaching reforms (r > r∗)
to signal their type (a form of populism akin to Acemoglu et al., 2013) or because type n
candidates start proposing reforms. We leave a complete analysis of this set-up to future
research.
Multiple voters By assuming a representative voter, we also abstract from informational
asymmetries and coordination problems among citizens. Introducing multiple voters com-
plicates the analysis substantially, but does not aﬀect the message of the paper. Prato and
Wolton (2016) extend a version of the model presented in this paper to an arbitrarily large
electorate, and show that (a slightly modiﬁed version of) Proposition 1 still holds despite the
presence of free-riding.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies how the demand for reform aﬀects the likelihood and quality of reform in
an environment with rationally ignorant voters. The electorate can obtain beneﬁcial reforms
and avoid botched reforms only when demand for reform is intermediate. In time of high
13More generally, our results are robust to the voter receiving a signal of candidates’ competence as long
as this signal is suﬃciently noisy. The reason is that the voter does not care about competence per se, but
wants to elect a competent candidate who commits to the reform policy. Therefore, the voter always has some
incentive to pay attention to the campaign. A similar reasoning explains why our results are also robust to
the presence of a (suﬃciently small) probability that the voter observes the candidates’ platforms without
exerting eﬀort. Details available upon request.
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demand for reform (for instance, due to poor economic conditions), the risk of botched reform
increases signiﬁcantly as incompetent candidates engage in a form of populism by proposing
policy change they know to be harmful.
The eﬀect of high demand on the probability of reform, on the other hand, depends on
the strength of the electorate’s selection concern. When a politician’s competence is very
important for the success of reforms, the probability of reform decreases (either no candidate
commits to a reformist agenda, or the electorate rationally exhibits high skepticism towards
those who do, and elects them with low probability). Conversely, when the selection concern
is low higher demand for reform does raise the probability of reform, but this comes with
signiﬁcant risks. The welfare-maximizing equilibrium exhibits a form of rational populism
whereby some candidates propose reforms despite being unable to successfully enact them.
By highlighting the role of voters’ selection concern, our results can help organize the mixed
empirical evidence on the relationship between crises and the likelihood of reform.
In this paper, we restrict our attention to a common-value environment among voters
(using a representative voter). This assumptions allows us to show that welfare-beneﬁcial
reforms can be impeded when demand is high even if there is no uncertainty about the
distribution of their costs and beneﬁts or groups blocking their adoption. A promising avenue
for future research, however, is to study the eﬀect of distributional conﬂicts on the adoption
of economic reforms within our theoretical framework.
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A Equilibrium deﬁnition and proofs
Up to Proposition 1, the analysis closely mirrors Prato and Wolton (2016). However, since
the model has diﬀerent notation and assumptions, in this Appendix we present all proofs.
We ﬁrst introduce some notation. Denote by σj(t) = (rj(t), yj(t)) ∈ {0, 1}×[0, 1] the strategy
(policy choice and communication eﬀort) of a type t ∈ {c, n} candidate j ∈ {1, 2}. The
tuple of strategies is denoted by σj ≡ (σj(c), σj(n)). Denote by mj ∈ {∅, rj} the outcome
of electoral communication: if mj = ∅ (mj = rj), communication has been unsuccessful
(successful) and the voter does not observe (observes) candidate j’s platform. We also denote
by μ(mj, x) ≡ μj the voter’s posterior belief that candidate j is competent conditional on her
level of attention x and observing mj . Finally, denote voter’s electoral strategy (probability
of electing candidate 1): Pr(e = 1) = s1(m1,m2, x) ∈ [0, 1].
Deﬁnition 1. The players’ strategies form a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) if the fol-
lowing conditions are satisﬁed.
1) s1(m1,m2, x) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
1/2
0
⇔ Eμ(uv(r1, x)|m1, σ1)  Eμ(uv(r2, x)|m2, σ2);
2) yj(t, rj) = argmaxy∈[0,1] E(uj(rj, y; t)|x, s1, σ−j), j ∈ {1, 2}, t ∈ {c, n};
3) x = argmaxx∈[0,1] E(uv(re, x)|s1, σ1, σ2);
4) ∀j ∈ {1, 2}, t ∈ {c, n},
rj(t) =
⎧⎨⎩ 10 ⇔ E(uj(1, yj(t, 1); t)|x, s1, σ−j)  E(uj(0, yj(t, 0); t)|x, s1, σ−j);
When indiﬀerent, we assume that candidates follow the strategy which maximizes the voter’s
welfare.
5) μ(mj, x) satisﬁes Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
Condition 1) is equivalent to the requirement that, after observing mj and m−j, the voter
elects candidate j ∈ {1, 2} with probability 1 rather than his opponent (−j) if and only if
(∀mj, m−j, σj, and σ−j):
μjrj(c)G− (1− μj)rj(n)τG > μ−jr−j(c)G− (1− μ−j)r−j(n)τG (3)
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Let Γ(σj(t), σ−j) = E
{
IA +
IB
2
∣∣ rj(t), yj(t); σ−j} be the probability that a type t ∈ {c, n}
candidate j is elected when he plays strategy σj(t) and his opponent plays σ−j, where A is the
event “equation (3) holds” and B is the event “both sides of (3) are equal.” The expectation
operator is over the probability of successful communication with candidate j ∈ {1, 2},
candidate −j and candidate −j’s type. Γ(σj(t), σ−j) is increasing with μ(rj(t), x)rj(c)G −
(1− μ(rj(t), x))rj(n)τG and μ(∅, x)rj(c)G− (1− μ(∅, x))rj(n)τG.
Lemma A.1. There is no equilibrium in which rj(c) = 0 and rj(n) = 1.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. First, suppose σj(n) = (1, yj(n)), with yj(n) > 0
and rj(c) = 0. When communication with the voter is successful, a n type candidate j is
elected with strictly positive probability if and only if (by (3)): −τG ≥ μ−jr−j(c)G − (1 −
μ−j)r−j(n)τG. When communication with the voter is not successful, a type n candidate j
is elected with strictly positive probability if and only if: −(1− μ(∅, x))τG ≥ μ−jr−j(c)G−
(1−μ−j)r−j(n)τG. Given the properties of the communication cost functions and yj(n) > 0,
we have μ(∅, x) ∈ (0, 1). Then it must be that: −(1− μ(∅, x))τG > −τG. Therefore, a type
n candidate’s probability of being elected is strictly greater when mj = ∅. Since a candidate
always values being in oﬃce (kn < 1) and communication is costly, σj(n) = (1, yj(n)) is
strictly dominated by σj(n) = (1, 0), a contradiction. Suppose a type n candidate j plays
σj(n) = (1, 0). Since the voter never observes his platform, his choice of rj(n) does not
aﬀect his probability of being elected. Since the reform is costly (kn > 0), it must be that
σj(n) = (1, 0) is weakly dominated by (0, 0).
Lemma A.2. In any equilibrium, a candidate’s winning probability is (weakly) greater after
successful communication.
Proof. Fix candidate −j’s strategy σ−j. Using Lemma A.1, we need to consider only three
cases: 1) rj(c) = 0, rj(n) = 0, 2) rj(c) = 1, rj(n) = 0, and 3) rj(c) = 1, rj(n) = 1. In case 1),
successful communication has no impact on the probability of being elected (the voter’s payoﬀ
is independent of a candidate’s type). In case 2), using a similar reasoning as in the proof
of Lemma A.3, a type n must exerts zero communication eﬀort. Successful communication
thus reveals that a candidate is competent and implements the reform. By (3), candidate j’s
probability of winning the election is weakly higher after successful communication. In case
3), at the communication stage, both types solve the same maximization problem, modulo
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the implementation cost:
yj(t, 1) = arg max
y∈[0,1]
{Γ((1, y), σ−j)(1− kt)− C(y)}
Suppose μ(1, x) < μ(∅, x). Then Γ((1, y), σ−j) is strictly decreasing in y, which implies
yj(c, 1) = yj(n, 1) (the objective function is strictly decreasing in y). But then μj(1, x) =
μj(∅, x), a contradiction. Hence it must be that Γ((1, y), σ−j) is weakly increasing in y.
Lemma A.3. In any equilibrium, a candidate exerts strictly positive communication eﬀort
if and only if he commits to the reform policy (r = 1).
Proof. Necessity. We prove the counterpart: rj = 0 ⇒ yj = 0. On the equilibrium path,
given rj(t), the maximization problem of a type t ∈ {c, n} candidate j ∈ {1, 2} chooses yj(t)
is: maxy≥0 Γ((rj(t), y), σ−j)(1−rj(t)kt)−C(y), j ∈ {1, 2} t ∈ {c, n} The solution yj(t) aﬀects
Γ(.; .) only through the probability that the voter observes mj(t) = rj(t). Using Lemma A.1,
we just need to focus on two cases: 1) rj(c) = rj(n) = 0 and 2) rj(c) = 1 and rj(n) =
0. In case 1), since the voter anticipates correctly candidates’ strategies in equilibrium,
communication has no eﬀect on a candidate’s electoral chances. Since communication is
costly, it must be that: yj(t) = 0. In case 2), μj(rj(n), x) = 0 and, by (3), Γ((rj(n), y), σ−j)
must be strictly decreasing in y, which immediately implies yj(n) = 0.
Suﬃciency. Suppose that a candidate chooses r = 1. Using a similar reasoning as in Lemma
A.1, ∀t ∈ {c, n} σ(t) = (1, 0) is weakly dominated by (0, 0). So on the equilibrium path,
r = 1 ⇒ y > 0.
Lemma A.4. For all parameter values, an unresponsive strategy proﬁle in which rj(t) = 0
∀(j, t) ∈ {1, 2} × {c, n} and x = 0 is a PBE.
Proof. Given x = 0, we have mj = ∅, ∀yj ∈ [0, 1], j ∈ {1, 2}. Using (3), the voter’s
expected policy payoﬀ from electing candidate j ∈ {1, 2} is 0. Consequently, candidate
j’s probability of winning the election does not depend on his or his opponent’s platform
choice: Γ(σj(t), σ−j) = 1/2, ∀σj(t), σ−j, t ∈ {c, n}, j ∈ {1, 2}. Using a similar reasoning
as in Lemma A.1, a type t ∈ {c, n} candidate j ∈ {1, 2} has no incentive to deviate from
σj(t) = (0, 0). Given σj(t) = (0, 0) and communication is costly, the voter has no incentive
to exert strictly positive communication eﬀort. Hence, the proposed strategies constitute an
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equilibrium for all parameter values, and the implied probability of winning the election is
1/2 for each candidate j ∈ {1, 2} of each type.
Lemma A.5. There exists kSSn : [0, 1] → [0, 1] satisfying kSSn (kc) > kc such that, when
kn ≤ kSSn (kc), rj(c) = 1 and rj(n) = 0 imply that, in any PBE, r−j(c) = 1 and r−j(n) = 0
for j ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. First, we prove by contradiction that rj(c) = 1 and rj(n) = 0 = r−j(c) = r−j(n)
cannot be a PBE strategy proﬁle. If it is, then the voter elects candidate j ∈ {1, 2} after
successful and unsuccessful communication since her expected utility from doing so is strictly
positive (given lim
y→1
C ′(y) = ∞, y < 1 and μ(∅, x) ∈ [0, 1]), whereas the expected utility from
electing candidate −j is 0. Since communication is costly and has no eﬀect on electoral
outcome, a type c candidate j does not exert communication eﬀort. By Lemma A.3, he
cannot choose rj(c) = 1 on the equilibrium path. A contradiction.
We also know from Lemma A.1, that r−j(c) = 0, r−j(n) = 1 cannot be part of a PBE.
There remains to show that r−j(c) = r−j(n) = 1 is also not incentive compatible under the
assumption.
Consider a semi-separating assessment (SS) when (without loss of generality) 1 pools on the
reform policy (r1(c) = r1(n) = 1) and 2 separates (r2(c) = 1, r2(n) = 0). Denote α
SS
j (t) =
xSSj y
SS
j (t), j ∈ {1, 2}, t ∈ {c, n}, the communication eﬀorts satisfy (see the Supplemental
Appendix for details):
C ′v(x
SS)
G
=(1− q)[qySS1 (c)− (1− q)τySS1 (n)− q(1 + τ)(1− 2αSS2 (c))ySS1 (n)] (4)
C ′(ySS1 (t)) =(q(1− αSS2 (c)) + (1− q))xSS(1− kt) (5)
C ′(ySS2 (c)) =(qα
SS
1 (c) + (1− q)αSS1 (n))xSS(1− kc) (6)
We claim that, for the semi-separating assessment to be a PBE, it is necessary that the
voter elects candidate 1 if and only if she learns his platform and does not learn candidate
2’s. Suppose not. We need to consider two cases: (i) candidate 1 is also elected when
communication with both candidates is unsuccessful (m1 = m2 = ∅ so the ‘only if’ fails
and (ii) candidate 1 is not elected when only communication with candidate 2 fails (m1 =
1, m2 = ∅) so the ‘if’ fails. In the second case, candidate 1 is elected with probability
zero, and thus has no incentive to commit to the reform policy. In the ﬁrst case, candidate 1
31
would be always elected unless communication with candidate 2 fails, and hence would have
no incentive to exert positive communication eﬀort. By Lemma A.3, this contradicts r1(t) = 1
for both types. Hence, we must have μ1(∅)−(1−μ1(∅))τ ≤ μ2(∅) ≤ μ1(1)−(1−μ1(1))τ , which
requires τ ≤ μ1(1)−μ2(∅)
1−μ1(1) . Notice that (omitting the superscript SS for notational simplicity)
μ2(∅) =
[
1 +
1− q
q
1
1− α2(c)
]−1
, μ1(1) =
[
1 +
1− q
q
α1(n)
α1(c)
]−1
.
Substituting these values into the condition τ ≤ μ1(1)−μ1(∅)
1−μ1(1) and rearranging, we obtain the
following necessary condition for the existence of a semi-separating equilibrium:
1
1+ 1−q
q
α1(n)
α1(c)
− 1
1+ 1−q
q
1
1−α2(c)
1− 1
1+ 1−q
q
α1(n)
α1(c)
>
q
1− q ⇔
1
1− α2(c)
(
α1(c)
α1(n)
− 1
)
>
1
1− q
Since the LHS of the last inequality approaches zero as kn approaches kc (by inspection
of 5, α1(n) approaches α1(c) as kn approaches kc), there exists k̂n
SS
(kc, G, τ) > kc such
that the inequality above is violated for all kn ≤ k̂n
SS
(kc, G, τ). We then obtain k
SS
n =
min(G,τ)∈R2+{k̂n
SS
(kc, G, τ)}.
An assessment is called separating if and only if it features rj(c) = 1 and rj(n) = 0 ∀j ∈ {1, 2}.
We use the superscript S to denote the candidates’ optimal communication eﬀorts and the
voter’s optimal attention associated with this assessment.
Lemma A.6. There exists k∗(kc) > kc such that whenever kn < k∗(kc), the equilibrium is
separating if and only if a separating assessment is a PBE.
Proof of Lemma A.6. We set k∗(kc) = kSS(kc). Notice that, by lemma A.5, if candidate
j ∈ {1, 2} plays a separating proﬁle, the same must happen to the two types of candidate
−j. Hence, there are four possible types of equilibrium: (i) a separating assessment (S), in
which both candidates commit to reform only when competent (rj(c) = 1 ∀ j ∈ {1, 2},
rj(n) = 0 ∀ j ∈ {1, 2}), (ii) a pooling assessment (P), in which all candidates propose the
reform regardless of their type (rj(t) = 1 ∀ (j, t) ∈ {1, 2} × {c, n}), (iii) an asymmetric
assessment (A), in which without loss of generality candidate j commits to reform regardless
of his type and candidate −j commits to the status quo regardless of this type (rj(t) =
1 ∀ t ∈ {c, n}, r−j(t) = 0 ∀ t ∈ {c, n}), and (iv) the unresponsive equilibrium (Lemma
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A.4).
Let V Ev be the expected payoﬀ to the voter associated with assessment E ∈ {A,N, P, S}, and
let αEt the implied probability of successful communication with a type t candidate.
14 From
Lemma A.3, V Nv = 0. It can be shown that V
S
v = qG + (1 − q)qα
S
1 (c)+α
S
2 (c)
2
G − Cv(xS) (see
the proof of Lemma A.8 for more details). Given Cv(0) = 0, it must be that V
S
v > qG > 0.
In the Supplemental Appendix, we also show that
V Av = qGα
A
c − (1− q)τGαAn − Cv(xA) (7)
V Pv = qG− (1− q)τG+ q(1− q)(1 + τ)G(αPc − αPn )− Cv(xP ) (8)
First, notice that αAc < 1 implies V
S
v > V
A
v . To see why V
S
v > V
P
v , notice that since
αPc − αPn < 1, V Pv < qG − (1 − q)2τG + q(1 − q)G < qG, where the last inequality follows
from the fact that (1− q)τ > q.
Lemma A.7. A separating assessment is a PBE only if μ(m1 = ∅, xS) = μ(m2 = ∅, xS)
where xS is the voter’s optimal attention.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose candidates play a separating strategy and that
without loss of generality μ(m1 = ∅, xS) > μ(m2 = ∅, xS). Since (by Lemma A.3) ySj (n) =
0, j ∈ {1, 2}, the above inequality implies that the voter always elects candidate 1 when
communication with either candidates is unsuccessful, by (3). A type n candidate 2’s expected
utility is thus 0. If a type n candidate 2 mimics a competent type’s platform by choosing
strategy σˆ2(n) = (1, yˆ2(n)), where yˆ2(n) = argmaxy∈[0,1] {Γ((1, y), σs1)(1− kN)− C(y)}, his
expected utility is strictly positive (since C(0) = 0 and Γ((1, y), σs1) > 0 because μ(1, x
S) = 1),
a contradiction.
Lemma A.8. In a separating assessment, candidates’ communication eﬀorts and the voter’s
level of attention are unique, and satisfy:
(i) incompetent candidates exert no communication eﬀort: ySj (n) = 0, j ∈ {1, 2};
(ii) competent candidates’ communication eﬀorts and the voter’s level of attention are strictly
14It can be checked that the probability is symmetric when candidates play a symmetric strategy, see
Lemma A.8 and the Supplemental Appendix for more details.
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positive: yS1 (c) = y
S
2 (c) := y
S(c) > 0 and xS > 0, where yS(c) and xS solve
C ′(yS(c)) = (1− kc)x
S
2
(9)
C ′v(x
S) = q(1− q)GyS(c) (10)
Proof. By Lemma A.3, we must have ySj (n) = 0, j ∈ {1, 2}. Consider now a c type j ∈ {1, 2}.
When choosing his communication eﬀort, he takes as given his opponent’s (y−j) and the
voter’s (x) communication eﬀorts. His expected utility, when he chooses communication
eﬀort yj, is:
Vj(1, yj; c) = q
(
yjx(1− y−jx) + yjxy−jx+ (1− yjx)(1− y−jx)
2
)
(1− kc)
+ (1− q)
(
yjx+
1− yjx
2
)
(1− kc)− C(yj) (11)
The expression above follows from the fact that, in this assessment, s1(∅, ∅) = 1/2 (by Lemma
A.7), s1(1, 1) = 1/2 (since μ(1, x) = 1 for both candidates), s1(1, ∅) = 1, and s1(∅, 1) = 0.
In words, the voter ﬂips a coin when communication with both is successful or unsuccessful
(Lemma A.7). When communication is successful only with candidate 1 (2), she elects
candidate 1 (2).
After rearranging, we get that a competent candidate 1 chooses his communication eﬀort
yj to maximize: maxyj∈[0,1]
(
1+yjx
2
)
(1 − kc) − q(1 − kc)y−jx2 − C(yj). We get the following
First-Order Condition (FOC):
C ′(yj(c)) =
1− kc
2
x (12)
The voter’s electoral strategy is in this assessment: s1(∅, ∅) = 1/2 (by Lemma A.7), s1(1, 1) =
1/2 (since μ(1, x) = 1 for both candidates), s1(1, ∅) = 1, and s1(∅, 1) = 0. The voter thus
solves the following maximization problem:
max
x∈[0,1]
{
q2G+ (1− q)q
(
y2xG+ (1− y2x)G
2
)
+ (1− q)qG
2
(1 + y1x)− Cv(x)
}
(13)
We thus have the following FOC:
C ′v(x) = q(1− q)
G
2
(y1 + y2) = q(1− q)Gy1 (14)
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Where the second equality comes from the fact that y1 = y2 by (9). It follows that y
S(c)
and xS (j ∈ {1, 2}) are deﬁned by the system (9)- (10). We now show that this system has
a unique strictly positive solution.
Let Y S(x) = (C ′)−1
(
1−kc
2
x
)
and h(x) = q(1 − q)Y S(x) − C ′v(x)/G. Since Cv(.) and C(.)
are thrice continuously diﬀerentiable, the function h(.) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable.
A necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of a strictly positive yS(c) and xS
is that the function h(x) has at least one strictly positive zero (since the voter’s welfare
is increasing in yS(c) by the Envelope Theorem, our criterion selects the largest zero of
h(x)). Given the properties of the communication cost functions, h(0) = 0 and h(1) < 0.
Therefore, to show that h(x) has a unique strictly positive zero, it is suﬃcient to show that (i)
h′(0) > 0 and (ii) h′(x) is decreasing. Diﬀerentiating h(·) using the deﬁnition of Y Sc (x) yields
h′(x) = q(1 − q) (1−kc)/2
C′′(Y Sc (x))
− C′′v (x)
G
. Using the convexity of C(·) and the fact that C ′′v (0) = 0,
we can write h′(0) ∝ 1−kc
2
> 0. Uniqueness follows from the fact that C ′′(·) and C ′′v (x) are
both weakly increasing. Notice that uniqueness and continuity of h(x) in kc and G imply
that xS and yS(c) are continuous in kc and G.
Lemma A.9. In a separating assessment, the voter’s level of attention xS and a competent
candidate’s communication eﬀort yS(c) increase with G.
Proof. From lemma A.8, (yS(c), xS) is the unique solution of (9)-(10). Using the properties
of h(x), we must have h(x) < (resp. >) 0 ∀ x ∈ (xS, 1] (resp. ∀ x ∈ (0, xS]). Hence, at
xS, h(x) must cross the horizontal axis from above. Since, for given x, h(x) is continuous
and decreasing in 1/G, the lemma immediately follows.
Lemma A.10. In a separating assessment, the voter’s attention (xS) and competent candi-
dates’ communication eﬀorts (yS(c)) decrease with the competent candidates’ implementation
cost (kc).
Proof. Notice that h(x) is continuous and decreasing in kc
(
dYc(x)
dkc
= −x
C′′(Yc(x) < 0
)
.
Let Vj(rj, yj; t) denote the the expected payoﬀ of a type t ∈ {c, n} candidate as a function
of his platform (rj ∈ {0, 1}) and communication (yj ≥ 0) choices in a separating assessment.
Taking the voter’s attention x and a competent candidate −j’s communication eﬀort as given,
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we obtain:
Vj(1, yj; t) =
1 + xyj − qxy−j
2
(1− kt)− C(yj) (15)
Vj(0, 0; t) =
1− qxy−j
2
(16)
Using (15) and (16), the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) of a competent candidate
j ∈ {1, 2} is:
Vj(1, y
S
j (c); c) ≥ Vj(0, 0; c)
⇔1 + y
S
j (c)x
S − qyS−j(c)xS
2
(1− kc)− C(ySj (c)) ≥
1− q
2
+ q
1− yS−j(c)xS
2
(17)
Denote yˆj(n) an incompetent candidate j’s optimal communication eﬀort when he commits
to the reform policy: yˆj(n) is deﬁned by C
′(yˆj(n)) = 1−kn2 x
S. An incompetent candidate j’s
(IC) is:
Vj(1, yˆ
S
j (n);n) ≤ Vj(0, 0;n)
⇔1 + yˆj(n)x
S − qyS−j(c)xS
2
(1− kn)− C(yˆj(n)) ≤ 1− q
2
+ q
1− yS−j(c)xS
2
(18)
Lemma A.11. When candidates play a separating strategy,
(i) An increase in G or a decrease in kc relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint of a
competent candidate j ∈ {1, 2};
(ii) An increase in G or a decrease in kc or kn tightens the incentive compatibility constraint
of an incompetent candidate j ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. For a competent candidate, the eﬀect ofG follows from d(Vj(1, y
S
j (c); c)−Vj(0, 0; c))/dG >
0 since dxS/dG > 0 and dyS−j/dG > 0 (Lemma A.9). A similar reasoning (using Lemma A.10)
implies the result for kc. The reasoning is reversed for an incompetent candidate (since the
inequality is reversed in his (IC)).
Proof of Proposition 1. We only prove necessity. The proof of suﬃciency proceeds by the
usual argument (details available upon request).
Point (i). Denote kc, the unique solution to the equation limG→∞ Vj(1, ySj (c); c) = Vj(0, 0; c).
15
15While limG→∞ xS = 1, the properties of the communication cost functions guarantee that Yc(1) < 1.
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To see that kSc exists, notice that for kc = 0, Vj(1, y
S
j (c); c) > Vj(0, 0; c), while for kc = 1,
Vj(1, y
S
j (c); c) ≤ 0 < Vj(0, 0; c). Uniqueness follows from Lemma A.11. If kc ≥ kc, (17) is
never satisﬁed and a separating strategy proﬁle cannot be an equilibrium.
Point (ii). We ﬁrst prove existence of the unique threshold G ∈ (0, 1) such that (17) holds
if and only if G ≥ G. Note that xS = 0 when G = 0, which implies yS(c) = 0. Given kc > 0,
Vj(1, 0; c) < Vj(0, 0; c) so (17) does not hold at G = 0. Since kc < k
S
c , there exists a ﬁnite G
′
such that Vj(1, y
S
j (c); c) > Vj(0, 0; c) for all G ≥ G′. Uniqueness follows directly from A.11
(i.e., the diﬀerence Vj(1, y
∗
j (c); c)− Vj(0, 0; c) is strictly increasing with G).
Existence and uniqueness of kSn(kc) ∈ (0, 1) follows from a similar reasoning as point (i).16
The proof of kSn(kc) > kc ∀ kc < kc is by contradiction. Suppose not. Then by Lemma
A.11 and the deﬁnition of kSc , limkn→kc Vj(1, yˆj(n);n)− Vj(0, 0;n) < 0, which contradicts the
deﬁnition of kSn(kc). Deﬁne kn(kc) = min{kSn (kc), kSSn (kc)}.
For kn ≥ kn(kc), an incompetent candidate’s (IC) is always satisﬁed, whereas a competent
candidate’s (IC) is satisﬁed if and only if G ≥ G.
Point (iii). The proof of existence and uniqueness of G ∈ (0, 1) follows from a similar
reasoning as for G. As Vj(1, yj(c); c)−Vj(0, 0; c) is decreasing with kc and increasing with G,
it can easily be checked that G < G given kc < kn. Now, an incompetent candidate’s (IC)
is satisﬁed only if G ≥ G, whereas a competent candidate’s (IC) is satisﬁed if and only if
G ≥ G.
Lemma A.12. There exists τ̂A : [0, 1] × R+ → [q/(1 − q),∞) such that the asymmetric
assessment (rj(t) = 1, r−j(t) = 0, j ∈ {1, 2}, t ∈ {c, n}) is a PBE if and only if τ ≤
τ̂A(kn, G).
Proof. Wlog suppose j = 1. In this asymmetric assessment (A), the voter elects candi-
date 1 only if she learns his platform m1 = 1. A type t ∈ {c, n} candidate 1’s (IC) is then:
xAyA1 (t)(1−kt)−C(yA1 (t)) ≥ 0, where the subscript A denotes optimal attention and commu-
nication eﬀort (see the Supplemental Appendix for more details). Given C(0) = 0, it is clear
that a necessary condition is xA > 0. Voter’s attention and candidate 1’s communication
This implies that type c’s communication eﬀort and expected payoﬀ are well deﬁned even for arbitrarily large
G.
16The only diﬀerence is that the upper bound on kn depends on kc— kn(kc)—since an incompetent can-
didate j’s incentive compatibility constraint depends on kc through the voter’s and a competent candidate
−j’s communication eﬀorts, see (18)).
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eﬀorts satisfy (see the Supplemental Appendix for details): C
′
v(x
A)
G
= qyA1 (c)− (1− q)τyA1 (n)
and C ′(yA1 (t)) = (1− kt)xA. Deﬁne
hA(x; τ) := qY Ac (x)− τ(1− q)Y An (x)− C ′v(x)/G, (19)
where Y At (x) = (C
′)−1((1 − kt)x). A necessary condition for existence of the equilibrium
is thus that the equation hA(x; τ) = 0 has at least one interior zero. Notice that hA(·) is
supermodular in (x,−τ): ∂2hA
∂x∂−τ = (1−q)dYn(x)dx > 0, since dY
A
n (x)
dx
> 0 by the convexity of C(·).
Supermodularity implies that the extremas of the set {x ∈ [0, 1] : hA(x; τ) = 0} are weakly
decreasing in τ (the opposite would require the existence of a point where ∂hA(x; τ)/∂x
is decreasing in −τ). Therefore, if hA(x; q/(1 − q)) has a strictly positive zero, then the
necessary condition xA > 0 holds for some τ ≥ q/(1 − q). Since hA(0; q/(1 − q)) = 0, it
is suﬃcient for existence of a strictly positive zero to show that ∂hA(0; q/(1 − q))/∂x ≥ 0.
Simple substitution yields ∂hA(x; q/(1− q))/∂x = q(Y ′c (x)− Y ′n(x))− C
′′
v (x)
G
. By assumption,
C ′′v (0) ≥ 0. If C ′′(0) > 0, then Y ′c (0) is bounded above and we obtain using the deﬁnition
of Yt(x), h
′
A(0) ∝ kn − kc > 0. If, instead, C ′′(0) = 0, then continuity and diﬀerentiability
of Yc(x) and Yn(x), C
′′(x) > 0, ∀x > 0, and Yc(x) − Yn(x) > 0 ∀x > 0 together imply
lim
x→0
Y ′c (x)− Y ′n(x) > 0. Suppose not, then it must exist x′ > 0 such that Yc(x)− Yn(x) ≤ 0,
a contradiction.
Supermodularity and the deﬁnition of hA(x; τ) (Equation 19) guarantees that there exists
τ̂A(kn, G) such that for all τ > τ̂
A(kn, G), h
A(x; τ) < 0 for all x > 0 (to see existence, take
τ → ∞, dependence on kn and G follows from the deﬁnition of hA(·)). Hence the asymmetric
equilibrium exists only if τ ≤ τ̂A(kn, G).
For suﬃciency, the proof that candidate 1 and the voter’s strategies are best response on the
equilibrium path follows from the usual argument. On the equilibrium path, candidate 2 does
not exert communication eﬀort (Lemma A.3). We need, however, to deﬁne the voter’s belief
after observing candidate 2’s platform (out-of-equilibrium event). We impose μ2(1, x
A) = q.
This belief implies that the voter elects candidate 1 whenever m1 = m2 = 1. To see this,
notice that μ1(1, x
A) > q since μ1(1, x
A) − (1 − μ1(1, xA))τ > 0 as xA > 0. With this out-
of-equilibrium belief, candidate 2 has no incentive to deviate since his electoral chances are
unaﬀected by his platform choice (he is elected if and only if m1 = ∅) and the reform policy
is costly. Hence, we have that τ ≤ τ̂A(kn, G) is a suﬃcient condition for the asymmetric
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equilibrium to exist.
Lemma A.13. There exists τPExist : [0, 1]×R+ → [q/(1−q),∞) such that a pooling assessment
(rj(t) = 1, j ∈ {1, 2}, t ∈ {c, n}) is a PBE only if τ ≥ τPExist(kn, G).
Proof. Under a pooling assessment (P), candidates’ communication eﬀorts and the voter’s
attention satisfy (see the Supplemental Appendix for details): C
′
v(x
P )
G
= q(1−q)(1+τ)(yP (c)−
yP (n)) and C ′(yP (t)) = 1−kt
2
xP . The voter’s optimal level of attention, xP , solves hP (x) =
q(1− q)(1+ τ)(Y Pc (x)−Y Pn (x))− C
′
v(x)
G
(where Y Pt (x) = (C
′)−1((1− kt)x/2)). Denote xP the
highest solution to hP (x) = 0 (existence follows from a similar reasoning as in Lemma A.12).
It can be checked that xP is increasing in τ (similar reasoning as in Lemma A.12).
A pooling assessment is a PBE only when a non competent candidate’s (IC) is satisﬁed.
Recall αPt = x
PyP (t), t ∈ {c, n}, an incompetent candidate’s (IC) is given by (see the
Supplemental Appendix for details):
αPn (1− kn)
2
− C(yPn ) ≥ kn
1− qαPc − (1− q)αPn
2
(20)
It can easily be checked that the left-hand side (right-hand side) of (20) is increasing (decreas-
ing) with xP . Hence, if Equation 20 does not hold for xP , it does not hold for any solution to
the communication subform. Using xP increasing with respect to τ , if Equation 20 holds as
τ → ∞, there exists τPExist(kn, G) ∈ [q/(1−q),∞) such that a pooling equilibrium exists only
if τ ≥ τPExist(kn, G) (dependence on kn and G follows from the deﬁnition of xP and Equa-
tion 20).17 If Equation 20 does not hold as τ → ∞, then denote (slightly abusing notation)
τPExist(kn, G) = ∞.
Lemma A.14. There exists τPWelf : [0, 1] → [q/(1−q),∞) such a pooling assessment (rj(t) =
1, j ∈ {1, 2}, t ∈ {c, n}) yields positive expected utility to the voter only if τ < τPWelf (kn).
Proof. Inspection of Equation 20 reveals that a pooling assessment is a PBE only if αPn (1−
kn) > kn(1−qαPc −(1−q)αPn ). Rearranging, we obtain that the diﬀerence αPc −αPn is bounded
above by α
P
c −kn
1−qkn . Inspection of Equation 8 reveals that V
P
v ∝ q − (1 − q)τ + q(1 − q)(αPc −
αPn )(1 + τ)− Cv(x
P )
G
. As a consequence, a necessary condition for V Pv ≥ 0 is
q − (1− q)τ + q(1− q)α
P
c − kn
1− qkn (1 + τ) > 0.
17We do not exclude the case when Equation 20 holds for all τ (i.e., τPExist(kn, G) = q/(1− q)).
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Using αPc < 1, straightforward algebraic manipulation yields that a necessary condition is
(1− qkn)(q − τ(1− q)) + q(1− q)(1 + τ)(1− kn) ≥ 0. Deﬁne τPWelf (kn) := q1−q
(
1 + 1−kn
1−q
)
so
the claim holds for all τ ≥ τPWelf (kn).
Corollary A.1. When τ ≥ τPWelf (kn), a pooling assessment is not an equilibrium.
Proof. Using Lemmas A.6 and A.14, a pooling assessment is welfare-dominated by the un-
responsive PBE. Giving our selection criterion, it cannot be an equilibrium.
Inspection of Equation 7 reveals that the assessment (A), when it is a PBE, welfare-dominates
the unresponsive equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) Let τN(kn, G) := max{τPWelf (kn, G), τ̂A(kn, G)} > q/(1 − q) (the
inequality follows from the deﬁnition of τ̂A(kn, G)). Above τ
N(kn, G), the equilibrium is
unresponsive since the asymmetric assessment is not a PBE (Lemma A.12) and the pooling
assessment is welfare dominated by the unresponsive PBE (Lemma A.14). Deﬁne τ 0 :=
max
G>G
τN(kn, G) (dropping dependence on kn for ease of exposition). The claims hold since
the equilibrium probability of reform drops to zero whenever G > G.
(ii) In all that follows, we assume that G = G. When τ ≥ τPWelf , the pooling equilibrium is
dominated by the unresponsive equilibrium (Lemma A.14). Deﬁne the probability of reform
in an asymmetric assessment by ΠA(τ) := qαAc + (1 − q)αAn . The corresponding quantity
associated with a separating assessment is ΠS := q + q(1− q)αS (by Lemma A.8, the voter’s
level of attention and a competent candidate’s eﬀort are independent of τ). Hence, a necessary
condition for the probability of reform to increase at G = G is αAc > q. Deﬁne x
A the highest
solution to hA(x; τ) = 0, with hA(·) deﬁned by (19). By Lemma A.12, xA is decreasing with
τ and as τ → τ̂A(kn, G), xA → 0. Therefore, there exists τR ∈ [q/(1 − q), τ̂A(kn, G)) (if
lim
τ→q/(1−q)
ΠA(τ) < ΠS, then denote τR = q/(1− q)) such that ΠA(τ) ≥ ΠS ⇔ τ ≤ τR. Finally,
let τ = max{τPWelf , τR}.
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Deﬁne τ := min
G>G
τ̂A(kn, G) (again dropping dependence on kn for
ease of exposition). By deﬁnition of τ̂A(·), τ > q/(1− q). By deﬁnition of τ , τ ≤ τ (both are
equal when τ̂A(kn, G) > τ
P
Welf (kn, G) for all G, a suﬃcient condition). The asymmetric PBE
always welfare-dominates the unresponsive PBE for τ ≤ τ and involves a strictly positive
probability of botched reform (unlike the separating PBE when it exists). Hence the claim
holds.
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(ii) Using the proof of proposition 2, we can simply set τ = min{τPWelf , τA}, so at G = G, the
equilibrium is either (i) pooling or (ii) asymmetric with a higher probability of reform than
separating.
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